Dictating Development? The Effects of Local Institutions under Upward Accountability

This paper studies the effects of a local institution with and without upward accountability on individual behavior change in Rwanda. Throughout Rwanda, local leaders organize mandatory community meetings on Saturdays to discuss and resolve issues of community concern. I analyze the effects of meetings on contraceptive adoption and bed net acquisition, and leverage a reform that introduced performance incentives for local leaders. Both outcomes were unpopular among the population, but desired by the central government. For identification, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in meetings’ attendance over time induced by exogeneous weather fluctuations. After the reform, I find that a rainy Saturday reduces the probability of contraceptive adoption by 18% and of bed net acquisition by 10% in the same month. Before the reform, rainfall on every weekday, including Saturdays, has no effect. This pattern for two incentivized, but otherwise unrelated behavior changes points to the reform as the common underlying shift. Finally, I present evidence suggesting that behavior change is involuntary. Overall, my findings challenge the presumed downward accountability of local institutions and indicate an interdependence with performance incentives.

Working Paper